Th e hard core of Bolzano's conception of truth can be captured by the following biconditional: a non-compound non-quantifi ed one-place predication expresses a true proposition (Satz an sich) if, and only if, the object that is referred to in that predication (really) has the property that is predicated of it. Th us the proposition that is expressed by the sentences 'Socrates is courageous', 'Socrate est courageux', 'Sokrates ist mutig' and many others is true just in case Socrates has courage. In this paper I shall focus on the sense of two words that occur not only in my characterization of the hard core of Bolzano's conception of truth but also in his own analysis (Erklärung) of this notion; namely, the sense of 'has (hat)' and the sense of 'property (Beschaff enheit)'.
1.
Let us begin with the three-letter word. In his logic Bolzano makes extensive use of the schemata 'A has (small-) b' and 'A is (capital-) B'. Whenever its instances stand in systematic correspondence he uses them in the following way: the term in the 'b' position of the 'has' sentence is the nominalization of term in the 'B' position of the corresponding 'is' sentence. Th us the schemata turn into pairs like 'Nathan has wisdom' and 'Nathan is wise', or ( ) Socrates has courage (S) Socrates is courageous.
Bolzano takes it to be a matter of course that the partners in such couples express the same proposition (1837, II, 10; 2 1841, 48). Ramsey agrees (1925, 60, 71) , and so does Strawson who uses the same example: 'Th e syntactical variation between "Socrates has courage" and "Socrates is courageous" is not more than that-a syntactical variation ' (1990, 318) . (In spite of this prominent support I think that Bolzano's propositional-identity claim is questionable, but I shall not question it here.
3 ) Th e proposition expressed by (S) is 'more clearly (deutlicher) and more correctly (richtiger) expressed' by ( ), or so Bolzano maintains (1837, II, 11). Why does he take ( ) to surpass (S) as regards clarity? I think his reason is similar to the reason logicians have for preferring 'Plato is a philosopher, and Aristotle is a philosopher' to 'Plato and Aristotle are philosophers'. According to the pivotal Bolzanian truth-equivalence, (S) expresses a truth just in case the object referred to in (S) really has the property (S) ascribes to it. If that is the best way to specify the truth conditions of (S) then the greater clarity of ( ) consists in the fact that it contains a term that answers the question, 'And which property is that?'. It is not obvious that this really is the best way of specifying the truth conditions of sentences like (S), but that is a question I shall not pursue here.
What about the other compliment Bolzano makes to ( ),-what is its greater (expressive) 'correctness' supposed to consist in? Bolzano believes that in sentences like (S) 'the verb 'to be' is not used in its proper meaning (eigentliche Bedeutung), but only in that improper [i.e. fi gurative] meaning that it has as copula'. 4 It has its proper meaning, he claims, in sentences like
